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O P I N I O N* 
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Jane Doe and John Doe (the “Doe Relators”) filed a qui tam complaint (the 
“Original Complaint”) under seal and under their actual names against Janssen 
Therapeutics, Janssen Products, LP, and Johnson & Johnson, Inc. (“Defendants”) 
alleging that Defendants had submitted false claims to federal and state governments in 
relation to marketing and sales of one of Defendants’ pharmaceutical products.  After the 
lawsuit proceeded for several years, the Doe Relators moved to amend the sealed 
Original Complaint to replace their real names with the pseudonyms John Doe and Jane 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Doe.  The District Court granted their motion and the Doe Relators filed the Amended 
Complaint.  About a week later, the United States filed a notice of election to decline 
intervention, requested the Amended Complaint be unsealed, and requested the Original 
Complaint remain sealed.  The District Court granted this relief.  The Doe Relators then 
voluntarily dismissed their case.  A year after the lawsuit was dismissed, Janssen 
Products, LP (“Janssen”) filed a motion to unseal the Original Complaint.  The District 
Court, applying the standard for motions to proceed anonymously that we endorsed in 
Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2011), granted Janssen’s motion. 
We conclude that the applicable standard to Janssen’s motion is our standard for 
motions to seal or unseal judicial records.  See In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand to the 
District Court to evaluate Janssen’s motion under this standard. 
I.1 
The Doe Relators initiated this action by filing the Original Complaint under their 
actual names and under seal alleging that Defendants violated the False Claims Act, 
31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq., and analogous state statutes.  The Doe Relators alleged that 
Defendants violated federal and state law by promoting off-label use of two HIV 
medications and submitting related false claims to the United States and state 
governments.  No summonses were issued, and the Original Complaint was never served 
on any of the Defendants. 
                                              
1 Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the procedural 
posture to date, we only include what is necessary to explain our decision. 
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After the case proceeded under seal for more than two years, the Doe Relators 
were informed that they were not the first relators to file a qui tam lawsuit against Janssen 
stemming from the allegations in the Doe Relators’ Original Complaint.  In response, the 
Doe Relators moved the District Court for leave to amend their Original Complaint.  The 
District Court granted the Doe Relators’ motion for leave to amend, and the Doe Relators 
filed their Amended Complaint under seal shortly thereafter.  The Amended Complaint 
was exactly the same as the Original Complaint with one exception: the Amended 
Complaint replaced each mention of the Doe Relators’ actual names with the 
pseudonyms Jane Doe or John Doe. 
After the Amended Complaint had been filed, the United States filed a Notice of 
Election to Decline Intervention in which the government requested that the Amended 
Complaint and the Notice of Election to Decline Intervention be unsealed but that all 
other contents of the docket remain under seal.  The District Court granted the 
government’s motion and the Amended Complaint was accordingly unsealed.  The 
Original Complaint remained under seal.  The Doe Relators subsequently voluntarily 
dismissed their suit. 
A year after the Doe Relators’ qui tam lawsuit was dismissed, Janssen filed a 
motion in the case asking the District Court to unseal the Original Complaint.  The 
District Court granted the motion in a sealed seven-page memorandum opinion.  The 
District Court ruled that our opinion in Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2011), 
governed Janssen’s motion, and that the Megless test favored unsealing the Doe Relators’ 
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Original Complaint.2  The District Court ordered that the Original Complaint remain 
under seal for forty-five days.  Before the Original Complaint was unsealed, the Doe 
Relators timely appealed. 
II.3 
“We review de novo a legal standard applied by a district court.”  Neale v. Volvo 
Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 
727 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
III. 
A.  In re Cendant Corp. applies to Janssen’s motion to unseal the Original 
Complaint. 
The Doe Relators argue that the Megless standard does not apply to Janssen’s 
motion to unseal the Original Complaint.  We agree. 
1.  The Megless and In re Cendant Corp. Standards 
In Doe v. Megless, we set out the test—applied by the District Court in this case—
that applies when a litigant moves to proceed anonymously, usually under a pseudonym.  
Megless, 654 F.3d at 408.  We noted that, to prevail on such a motion, “a plaintiff must 
show ‘both (1) a fear of severe harm, and (2) that the fear of severe harm is reasonable.’”  
Id. (quoting Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 
1043 (9th Cir. 2010)).  We further indicated that once a litigant makes this initial 
                                              
2 We do not discuss the District Court’s factfinding or analysis because the District 
Court’s memorandum was filed under seal and remains under seal. 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 31 U.S.C. § 3732.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 
157, 160–61 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 6 
 
showing, “district courts should balance a plaintiff’s interest and fear against the public’s 
strong interest in an open litigation process.”  Id.  In this balancing test, there are several 
factors that would favor the grant of anonymity and several that would disfavor it.4 
When a litigant instead moves to seal or unseal judicial records, we instruct district 
courts to apply a different standard.  In In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & 
Products Liability Litigation, 924 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 2019), we noted that “a common law 
right of access attaches to judicial proceedings and records” and encompasses “the right 
to . . . inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and 
documents.”  In re Avandia, 924 F.3d at 672 (internal quotation marks and citations 
                                              
4 The factors that weigh in favor of anonymity include but are not limited to: 
(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential; 
(2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and 
the substantiality of these bases; (3) the magnitude of the public interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant’s identity; (4) whether, because 
of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an 
atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigant’s identit[y]; (5) the 
undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and 
attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the price of being publicly 
identified; and (6) whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously has 
illegitimate ulterior motives. 
Megless, 654 F.3d at 409.  The factors disfavoring anonymity include but are not limited 
to: 
(1) the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of litigants; 
(2) whether, because of the subject matter of this litigation, the status of the 
litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest 
in knowing the litigant’s identit[y], beyond the public’s interest which is 
normally obtained; and (3) whether the opposition to pseudonym by counsel, 




omitted).  But “[a]lthough our courts recognize a general common law right to inspect 
and to copy judicial records and documents, the right is not absolute.”  Littlejohn v. BIC 
Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 
U.S. 589, 598 (1978)).  District courts evaluating whether to deny this public access to a 
particular judicial record—usually by way of placing the judicial record under seal—look 
to our opinion in In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2001), for the governing 
legal standard.  See In re Avandia, 924 F.3d at 672. 
In re Cendant Corp. dictates that a party seeking to overcome the presumption of 
access in relation to a judicial record bears the burden of showing that its interest in 
secrecy outweighs the presumption.  See In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 194.  The party 
who seeks to seal the document must show that “the material is the kind of information 
that courts will protect and that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury 
to the party seeking closure.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  “In delineating the 
injury to be prevented, specificity is essential.  Broad allegations of harm, bereft of 
specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient.”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  The district court must then articulate the “compelling countervailing interests 
to be protected,” make “specific findings on the record concerning the effects of 
disclosure,” and “provide[ ] an opportunity for interested third parties to be heard.”  Id. 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
“[C]areful factfinding and balancing of competing interests is required before the strong 
presumption of openness can be overcome by the secrecy interests of private litigants.”  
Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 1993).  
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“Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and access has been 
denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes.”  
Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). 
2.  In re Cendant Corp. applies to Janssen’s motion to unseal the 
Original Complaint. 
The District Court in this case was presented with and ruled on Janssen’s motion 
to unseal the Original Complaint.  Because Janssen’s motion was a motion to unseal a 
judicial record, the standard from In re Cendant Corp. applies.  Megless governs the 
distinct question of whether a litigant may proceed with litigation anonymously, and here 
the litigants had dismissed their case rendering Megless inapplicable.  On remand, the 
District Court should conduct the factfinding and balancing outlined by In re Cendant 
Corp. and our related jurisprudence on this issue.  In doing so, the District Court should 
consider whether Janssen’s motion is a “vehicle for improper purposes,” Littlejohn, 851 
F.2d at 678 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598), in which case the Original Complaint may 
appropriately remain sealed.5 
                                              
5 The District Court noted that the Doe Relators’ identities are not particularly relevant to 
the claims asserted in their complaint.  The allegations relating to those claims are 
already public so the issue presented is really regarding the public interest only in the 
Doe Relators’ names, which should be balanced against the Doe Relators’ allegation of 
harm.  The Doe Relators question Janssen’s motives as being improper and as evidence 
of a retaliatory purpose and desire to harm them.  The District Court did not make any 
direct reference to this aspect of the issue. 
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B.  The District Court did not err by allowing Janssen to move to unseal the 
Original Complaint. 
The Doe Relators also argue that the District Court erred when it allowed Janssen 
to move to unseal the Original Complaint.  We agree with the Doe Relators that the 
District Court would have been justified in requiring Janssen to move to intervene or to 
file a separate complaint seeking disclosure.  See Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 677 n.7 (“Third 
parties seeking access to the judicial record after the termination of an action may 
therefore be required to proceed by complaint or order to show cause.”).  But we do not 
conclude that the District Court’s failure to require Janssen to move to intervene or file a 
separate complaint is a ground for reversal on appeal.  See Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. 
Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 341 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (“It would be a 
needless formality to require [the moving party] to return to the district court to file a 
motion to intervene in the [] suit at this late date.”). 
IV. 
We will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings. 
